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ABSTRACT
Web application security is a definite threat to the world’s information technology
infrastructure. The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP), generally defines web
application security violations as unauthorized or unintentional exposure, disclosure, or loss of
personal information. These breaches occur without the company’s knowledge and it often
takes a while before the web application attack is revealed to the public, specifically because
the security violations are fixed. Due to the need to protect their reputation, organizations have
begun researching solutions to these problems. The most widely accepted solution is the use
of an Intrusion Detection System (IDS). Such systems currently rely on either signatures of the
attack used for the data breach or changes in the behavior patterns of the system to identify an
intruder. These systems, either signature-based or anomaly-based, are readily understood by
attackers. Issues arise when attacks are not noticed by an existing IDS because the attack does
not fit the pre-defined attack signatures the IDS is implemented to discover. Despite current
IDSs capabilities, little research has identified a method to detect all potential attacks on a
system.
This thesis intends to address this problem. A particular emphasis will be placed on detecting
advanced attacks, such as those that take place at the application layer. These types of attacks
are able to bypass existing IDSs, increase the potential for a web application security breach
to occur and not be detected. In particular, the attacks under study are all web application layer
attacks. Those included in this thesis are SQL injection, cross-site scripting, directory traversal
and remote file inclusion. This work identifies common and existing data breach detection
methods as well as the necessary improvements for IDS models. Ultimately, the proposed
approach combines an anomaly detection technique measured by cross entropy and a
signature-based attack detection framework utilizing genetic algorithm. The proposed hybrid
model for data breach detection benefits organizations by increasing security measures and
allowing attacks to be identified in less time and more efficiently.
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Chapter 1: Motivation, Problem Statement and Contribution
1.1

Background

Even the novice user comprehends that data security breaches are not unfamiliar occurrences in
this fast-paced, ever-advancing technological world. To understand what a data security breach is,
the definition must be unambiguous. A data breach, specifically in relation to privacy, occurs when
an unauthorized person, such as a skilled hacker [1], obtains the personal information of others. In
a more general sense, a data security breach can be defined as an organization’s unauthorized or
unintentional exposure, disclosure, or loss of personal information [2]. Another way to present this
is to say that a data breach can be simply defined as the accidental or unintentional loss of sensitive
data [3]. Given that such threats exist and are of high concern, it is more than important to have
some type of intrusion detection system. An Intrusion Detection System (IDS), is a system that
protects computer networks against attacks. These systems work with the network’s existing
firewalls and anti-virus systems [4].

Currently, there are two common types of IDS: signature-based intrusion detection systems and
anomaly-based intrusion detection systems. Signature-based IDS are commonly called misusebased intrusion detection systems. These systems rely on signatures to recognize the attacks.
Signature-based IDS would ideally identify 100% of the attacks with no false alarms as long as
signatures are specified ahead of time. However, each signature, even if it leads to the same attack,
has the potential to be unique from any other signatures. This is the most commonly implemented
IDS [5, 6, 7].

The above explanation can be contrasted with the other common type of IDS: an anomaly detection
system. This type of IDS focuses on the system’s normal behaviors instead of focusing on attack
behaviors, as seen with signature-based intrusion detection systems. To implement this type of
IDS, the approach is to use two phases. The first phase is the training phase where the system’s
behavior is observed in the absence of any type of attack. Normal behavior for the system is
identified into a profile. After this, the second phase or detection phase, begins. In this phase, the
stored profile is compared to the way the system is currently behaving and deviations from the
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profiles are considered potential attacks on the system. This can lead to several false negative
alarms [8, 9, 10]. In an anomaly-based IDS, the system watches for changes from the expected
behavior of the system. Currently, entropy and/or KLD have shown promising results in the
literature surrounding mobile malware application detection [11].

1.2

Motivation

Each type of system has its own benefits and drawbacks. A hybrid model can optimize the benefits
and minimize the drawbacks of the two systems. Hybrid models are essentially the combination
of a signature-based detection approach and an anomaly-based detection system. To explain the
need for a hybrid model, the various attacks that can be used to create a data security breach must
be considered. Common attacks that are utilized to carry out data breaches are SQL Injection
(SQLI) [12], brute-force [13], buffer overflows [14], Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) [15], Remote File
Inclusion (RFI) [70], Directory Traversal (DT) [71] and Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) [16]
to name a few. In addition, hybrid models have a central focus on the newest threat: polymorphic
attacks [17]. A limited amount of work has been done on hybrid models due to the nature of
aforementioned polymorphic attacks [18].

This research work identifies numerous types of attacks that can result in data breaches detected
by the proposed hybrid model. The model is based on analyses of logs that are generated by the
web server and database server, which is explained a bit later in this proposal. The results of this
study benefit and influence decisions of network and system administrators at companies who use
an existing IDS and those who may be looking for a more advanced IDS model. End users may
not see an exact benefit, but the security of their personal data may be exponentially increased.

In this work, we have replicated four specific web application attacks by using open source web
applications. For the study, we employed an Apache web server and a MySQL database server in
a virtual environment with a Windows operating system. Simultaneously, the study was run with
an identical set up and design, but through the use of a Linux operating system. Examples of what
the URLs may look like for the specified attacks under study are presented in the Table below.
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Attack
SQLI
XSS
RFI
DT
1.3

Table 1: Examples of Attacks in URLs
Example URL
http://www.xyz.com/login.php?uid=jonh&pwd=’ or 1=1 -http://www.xyz.com/index.php?uid=><body onload=alert('test1')>&pwd=test
http://www.xyz.com/test.php?uid=www.badsite.com/a.php
http://www.xyz.com/index.php?uid=../../../../ dir/pwd.txt

Problem Statement

Log data analysis is a common practice used for the detection of data security breaches. This
practice, however, can pose challenges for companies and organizations due to the vast number of
data security breaches that are not detected. Several issues concerning log data analyses currently
exist. One main problem is the creation of logs from multiple sources. The logs from all of the
different sources do not necessarily contain the same information, creating the need for a universal
log collector and analyzer. For instance, when a user has access to a company website, the
company’s web application server and database server both create separate logs. If a universal log
analyzer were in place, any potential data security breaches would be easier to identify. Another
problem with logs on different servers is that they may be located in different geographical regions
or time zones. The timestamp that servers automatically place on the log may not match thus
making the detection of a data security breach that much more strenuous.

Current literature shows little effort on combining anomaly-based and signature-based methods of
identifying data security breaches and new types of attacks at the application layer. The reason for
combining both methods is to detect even more attacks than either approach could detect alone.
By compiling each of the approaches, additional false positive and false negative attacks can be
discovered as well. In this thesis, the priority is to understand if current anomaly-based and
signature-based approaches are sufficient to detect application layer attacks and how to improve
upon these techniques.

We are applying genetic algorithm to pre-existing signatures to generate mutant signatures to
detect attack violations. Similarly, since information theoretic metrics have not appeared much in
the literature, this thesis is aimed at incorporating information theory as a computational approach
to develop a new anomaly-based approach. There are two key research questions we plan to answer
in this thesis:
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Could we develop an anomaly-based IDS to mitigate attacks on web applications? How
effective the new approach would be compared to other existing anomaly-based approaches?



How do we overcome the limited list of attack signatures in existing signature-based IDS
with the goal of detecting new attacks? How effective is the new approach compared to
existing signature-based approaches?

1.4

Research Methodology

The research methodology involved multiple literature reviews of more than 40 articles. Content
within the articles varied. For example, articles were included that discuss anomalies, signatures,
intrusion detection systems, and web application attacks. The methods used for this research
include the following activities:
1) Conduct literature searches on attacks related to data breaches, anomaly-based attack
detection, signature-based attack detection, hybrid models and log analysis.
2) Explore the logs based on attack detection types, categorizing them as signature-based or
anomaly-based detection approaches, to create an offline analysis framework for storing
and indexing the data from the various logs.
3) Develop a set of pre-defined signatures from an established database and a model that
represents a normal data (training data) access pattern to make an abnormal data (testing
data) access pattern identifiable.
4) Calculate the result of the test log data to measure the performance of the proposed
solution at detecting false positives and false negatives.
5) Compare the results using information theoretic metrics with other available prototype
tools on performance.

1.5

Overview of Research Tasks

This work addresses the stated research by performing the following tasks:
1) Conduct Literature Search
i. Conduct literature search on existing log combination techniques, specifically aimed at
methods used by intrusion detection systems. Since there are two main types of intrusion
detection systems, the literature search will include explanations and techniques of each
type.
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ii. Compose a survey of compiled papers related to this topic and document the findings.
2) Develop Virtual Environment
i. Profile available pre-defined signature and anomaly-based intrusion detection systems
and identify common attacks within each IDS and which logs are generated by these
attacks.
ii. Use the resulting profile to develop a centralized log server that is connected to a web
server and a database server collecting logs from the generated attacks.
3) Develop Hybrid Detection Model
i. Propose detection techniques for both types of attacks in one model. This purpose of this
is to detect any type of attack so prevention methods can be deployed.
ii. Use the hybrid model to demonstrate the proposed approach within controlled
environment.
4)

Conduct Testing and Evaluation
i. Deploy web applications in XAMPP in the Linux and Windows environments. XAMPP
is an integrated web platform consisting of a web server and a database server.
ii. Generate normal traffic and attack traffic data and MySQL logs and Apache logs to detect
the application layer attacks.
iii. Detect anomalies using information theoretic metrics with an expected false alarm rate
below the average of 8.4% seen in the literature [8, 18].
iv. Detect attacks that have unique signatures based on a signature database as seen in other
studies conducted in the past [19-20]. The expected accuracy level of signature detection
is 100%.

5) Disseminate Work Results
i. Disseminate the log analyzer and dataset with those in the field of technology.
ii. Prepare and submit one or more papers for publication at relevant venues.

In the next Chapter, we discuss the findings from literature surveys surrounding our research goals
and objectives.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
2.1 Overview
This Chapter elaborates on the surrounding literature searches and explains the findings from the
literature research. Due to the level of detail that is required for this thesis, multiple literature
reviews were carried out, but only five directly apply to the case studies and fit within the context
of this work. In subsequent sections, first, anomaly-based intrusion detection is explained,
followed by a short description of how entropy is used to detect attacks. Then, a section discussing
related literature on signature based intrusion detection is provided. Next, genetic algorithms are
illustrated as a new avenue for attack detection. Finally, this Chapter concludes with a discourse
about benchmarks used for evaluation of datasets in the literature.

2.2 Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection
Literature surrounding this topic is not scarce. In fact, in [21] the authors study the development
of an IDS by a training dataset collected from a large scale web application. The work only
considered GET requests and did not consider POST types of requests or response pages. They
captured logs from a TShark tool and converted them to Common Log Format. The filtered data
was generated by accessing sub-applications. They manually inspected every single request to
gather a filtered (good) dataset. Their detection used nine models. Cho et al. [22] develop a
Bayesian parameter estimation-based anomaly detection approach from web server logs and
showed that it outperformed signature-based tools such as Snort. They assume a user visits a set
of pages in a certain order (denoted as a session). Their approach is effective when the order is
maintained. Ariu [23] develop a host-based IDS to protect web applications against attacks by
employing the Hidden Markov Model (HMM). HMM is used to model a sequence of attributes
and their values received by web applications. To account for various parameters and their values,
they employ multiple HMMs and combine them to generate an output for a given request on
likelihood that it would be generated from the training dataset.

Park et al. [24] analyze both GET and POST request data and capture the profiles of the data for
each parameter. Then they apply the Needleman-Wunch algorithm for a new parameter value to
see if the new value would be accepted or not as part of the alarm generation process. Le et al. [25]
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develop the DoubleGuard framework that examines both web server and database server logs to
precisely detect attacks leaking confidential information. They report 0% false positive rate for
static web pages, and 0.6% false positive rate for dynamic web pages. A similar approach has been
proposed by Vigna et al. [26] earlier. Their work reduces false positive warnings in a web-based
anomaly IDS by combining web log anomaly detection and a SQL query anomaly detector. In
their approach, a request that was found to be anomalous, based on logs, would still be issued to a
database server if it is found that the request is not accessing sensitive data from the server.

Ludinard et al. [27] profile web applications by learning invariants (e.g., a user session should
have same value as the login value). Then source code is instrumented to check violation of
invariants. If an invariant is violated, it indicates an anomalous input has been supplied. Li et al.
[28] develop an anomaly-based IDS by first decomposing web sessions into workflows. A
workflow consists of a set of atomic requests which may access one or more data objects. They
apply HMM to model the sequence of the data access of workflows. Gimenez et al. [29] develop
a web application firewall (as an anomalous request detector) and captured its behavior through
an XML file, which specifies the desired attributes of parameter values. An input value deviating
from the expressed profile is considered an attack. However, the approach would generate false
positive warnings as it does not consider page and path information to be more precise.

Our work [30] is focused on web-based anomaly detection analyzing log files, based on the
outlined work of Robertson et al. [31]. Both studies consider similar resource names to compare a
new request with profiled requests to reduce false positive warnings. However, we apply
information theoretic measures to compare entropy levels for parameter combinations and values.
A comparison of each aforementioned study to our own objectives is provided in Table 2.
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Table 2: Related Works on Anomaly-based IDS
Author(s)
Nascimento et al.
[21]

Cho et al. [22]

Ariu [23]

Park et al. [24]

Le et al. [25]

Vigna et al. [26]

Ludinard et al. [27]

Li et al. [28]

Study summary
The work only considered GET requests
and did not consider POST types of
requests or response pages; Captured logs
from a TShark tool and converted them to
Common Log Format; The filtered data
was generated by accessing subapplications
Develop a Bayesian parameter estimation
based anomaly detection approach from
web server logs and showed that it
outperformed signature-based tools such
as SNORT; Assume a user visits a set of
pages in a certain order
Create a host-based IDS to protect web
applications against attacks by employing
the Hidden Markov Model (HMM).
HMM is used to model a sequence of
attributes and their values received by
web applications
Analyze both GET and POST request data
and capture the profiles of the data for
each parameter; Apply the NeedlemanWunch algorithm for a new parameter
value to see if it would be accepted as part
of the alarm generation process
Create the DoubleGuard framework that
examines web server and database server
logs to detect attacks leaking confidential
information
Reduce false positive warnings by
combining web log anomaly detection and
a SQL query anomaly detector; A request
that was found to be anomalous would
still be issued to a database server if the
request is not accessing sensitive data
Profile web applications by learning
invariants (e.g., a user session should have
same value as the login value); Then
source code is instrumented to check for
violation of invariants, which indicate
anomalous input
Develop an anomaly-based IDS by
decomposing web sessions into
workflows of a set of atomic requests
which may access one or more data
objects; Apply the Hidden Markov Model
19

Contrast with our study [30]
We employ both server and client
side tools to collect GET and POST
data, combined them to form unified
log files and processed them for
defining good and bad datasets

Our approach relies on path
resources and does not need to rely
on the order in which a user visits
different pages

Our approach is free from the state
explosion problem that the HMM
approach suffers from

We employ entropy levels of
parameter values for profiling and
attack detection

Our study uses a similar framework,
but aims to identify all potential
attacks
We focus on web server logs and
apply entropy measures to detect
anomalous requests

Our work does not rely on source
code instrumentation

We apply cross entropy of the
parameter name, value, and types

Author(s)

Gimenez et al. [29]

Robertson et al. [31]

Study summary
(HMM) to model the sequence of the data
access of workflows
Use a web application firewall as an
anomalous request detector and specifies
the desired attributes of parameter values;
This generates false positive warnings
since it does not consider page and path
information
Similar resource names are used to
compare new requests with profiled
requests to reduce false positive warnings

Contrast with our study [30]

Our work does not rely on firewall
policies and applies entropy
measures to detect anomalous
requests

We apply information theoretic
measures to compare entropy levels
for parameter combinations and
values

2.3 Related Works: Information Theoretic Metrics
The earliest work we are aware of in the literature is from Lee et al. [32]. In their work, the authors
applied several metrics (entropy, relative entropy and conditional entropy) to model network log
data to demonstrate anomalies. Similar to their work, we apply entropy to model web request
parameter values. However, we explore the application of information theoretic metrics for webbased anomaly detection. Shahriar et al. [33] apply entropy to detect vulnerable SQL queries in
PHP web applications. Later they explore an information theory based dissimilarity metric
(Kullback-Leibler Divergence) to detect XSS attacks in web applications [34]. The KLD measures
have been explored to detect repackaged Android malware [36] and content provider leakage
vulnerabilities [35]. Ozonat et al. [37] detect anomalies in performance metric behavior in largescale distributed web services applying information theoretic metrics. Below, Table 3 presents
these works with additional details.
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Table 3: Detecting Anomalies through Information Theoretic Metrics
Author(s)
Lee et al. [32]

Shahriar et al. [33]

Shahriar et al. [34]
Cooper et al. [35]

Shahriar et al. [36]

Ozonat [37]

Main Objective
Suggest how to build the correct anomaly
IDS for audit datasets and measure the
performance
Discover PHP web applications that are
vulnerable to SQL injection without
relying on attack input
Implement malicious JavaScript code
intentionally to find XSS attacks
Identify the source and the source code
behind specific malicious functions of
interest on Google’s Android mobile
operating system
Detect repackaged malware on an
Android operating system to avoid end
users from downloading applications with
unexpected, malicious functionalities
Model the temporal and spatial
relationships between various web
services to find anomalies

Metrics Used
Entropy, Conditional Entropy,
Relative Entropy, Information Gain
and Information Cost
Entropy

Kullback-Leibler Divergence
Kullback-Leibler Divergence

Kullback-Leibler Divergence

Relative Entropy

2.4 Signature-Based Intrusion Detection
A representative sample of literature works have developed signature-based IDSs [20, 38, 39, 40,
41, 42]. The vast amount of research on this topic has focused on the network layer and multiple
Denial of Service attacks. Each of the previously mentioned works has its own strengths, but all
of the approaches have universal underlying limitations. First, in the literature, there is little widespread coverage of the known web application layer attacks (see Table 4 for the levels we follow
in this Chapter). Each study identified at least one of these types of attacks. Second, each of the
related works have yet to attain zero false positive and false negative rates with only one exception.

Finally, regardless of the type of attack the authors were searching for, each study only considered
one type of log data for analysis. This paper addresses these limitations by discussing a signaturebased IDS framework to detect certain application layer attacks by analyzing data from multiple
logs generated by web applications. The included signature-based IDS is meant to protect web
applications. Table 4 shows various attack types at different levels and related work that proposed
IDS. This Table was created based on industry-level data [44]. Our approach analyzes web server
log data, trains an IDS using a GA, and detects three common web application attacks (Cross-Site
21

Scripting, SQL Injection and Remote File Inclusion attacks). The definitions and explanations of
these attacks can be found in Section 2 of Chapter 4. In addition, the evaluation of previously
collected normal data and newly created malicious data via this approach would provide a detailed
view of the results.
Table 4: Signature-based Attack Detection
App Layer Attack Type
Work(s)
XSS
[15, 19, 30, 41, 43]
RFI
[30, 43, 46]
Application
SQLI
[12, 30, 43, 45]
Brute-Force
[13, 15, 40]
Buffer Overflow
[5]
CSRF
[53]
Zero-days
[38]
SYN/ACK
[40]
Transport
XMAS Scans
[20]
DoS
[5, 39]
Apache2
[42]
Smurfs
[20]
Network
Ping-of-Death
[20]
SYN flooding
[40]
For our purposes, the network layer and the transport layer attacks in the Table 4 above are
irrelevant. However, it serves to illustrate that attacks are diverse and can occur in other contexts
outside of this case study. From the vast body of literature about signature-based IDSs, we classify
the works in multiple ways. We look at benchmark data sources, the attributes of examined data,
metrics employed by the IDS, the environment where implementation and evaluation was
conducted, the types of attacks being covered, and reported performance rates (false positive and
false negative rates). Among all the works, one study achieved detection of zero-day attacks by
analyzing web and database server logs, and examining attack code, command payload and traffic
generated by the payload [38]. Neelakantan et al. [39] used protocol information, headers, and
packet payloads of packet captures to reduce the total number of false alarms from DDoS attacks.
The rules defining the source address, destination address and destination port were used to
increase the speed of signature detection in another study [40].
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In [20], the signature of a priori algorithm from the MySQL database logs was proposed to detect
known network level attacks. Based on PHP source code, Gupta et al. [41] used a controlled VM
to detect XSS attacks achieving 0% FP and 0% FN rate. The authors of [42] used known SNORT
and ClamAV signatures to detect signature-based attacks. Additionally, the researchers utilized a
honeypot to collect data for a character frequency exclusive signature matching scheme and the
Boyer-Moore algorithm was applied to the dataset. Through the use of Mail Exchange (MX)
records on Windows servers, the authors of were able to brute-force into numerous Hotmail
addresses [13]. In [5], Vigna et al. examined Apache logs to collect data on string length and
sequence and exploited mutations to detect buffer overflows, directory traversals and other attacks.

Chou [12] used web servers that were hosted in a Cloud environment to detect SQL injections,
XSS, and brute-force attacks. Finally, in [15] the researchers looked at innerHTML properties such
as GET, HTTP header and cookies to determine the presence of mutation-based XSS attacks,
denoted as mXSS. This work, in contrast, uses logs collected from both the web server and the
MySQL database for analysis. The environment is configured with a single host running multiple
virtual machines (VMs) within a virtual cluster. Some of the VMs are running Windows while
others are running Linux. We decided to use a signature matching scheme and added genetic
operators to introduce changes into the signatures. Such mutation allowed for the GA to detect all
of the known attack input. These include XSS, SQLI and RFI attacks and result in 0% false positive
rate and 0% false negative rate. We outline the major points of each of these studies and compare
them with our proposed approach, as shown in Table 5 below.

Table 5: Related Work on Signature Based Attack Detection Approaches
Author
Holm [38]

Environment,
Attributes Metrics used
configuration,
Attacks
of data
in their
virtual
detected
examined
model
machines
Web servers Attack code, % of known Windows
Zero-day
and database command
attacks
2000, XP,
Attacks
servers
payload,
detected
2003, Vista
traffic
and Ubuntu
generated by
10.04
the payload
Source of
data/
benchmark
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Effort to
reduce alarm
rates
(FP and FN)
False positives
are mentioned,
but no % is
provided due
to the variety
of employed
OS

Author

Source of
data/
benchmark

Neelakantan Apache,
et al. [39]
OpenSSH,
SMTP

Krugel et al. Web servers
[40]

Modi et al.
[20]

MySQL
database log

Gupta et al.
[41]

PHP Source
Code

Meng et al.
[42]

Honeypot

Parwani et
al. [13]

MX records
on Windows
servers
Web
servers, such
as Apache

Vigna et al.
[5]

Environment,
Attributes Metrics used
configuration,
of data
in their
virtual
examined
model
machines
Protocol
% of critical Linux (Redinformation, alarms
Hat), Windows
headers, and generated
2003 and
packet
Windows 2000
payloads of
packet
captures
Rules
Average
Red-Hat Linux
defining the increase in
source
speed of
address,
signaturedestination detection
address, and
destination
port
Signature A Proposed
Eucalyptus on
priori
solution, not Ubuntu
Algorithm
implemented
thus far
HTML
Number of
Controlled VM
Context
safe vs.
including
unsafe files
styles, body
tag names,
etc.
Character- Maximum
VMs in Cloud
frequency
execution
Environment
exclusive
time variance
signature
using
matching
incoming
scheme and payload or
the Boyer- signature set
Moore
partitions
algorithm
Expired
Number of
Windows
Hotmail
accounts that
addresses
were hacked
String length Number of
Linux,
and
signatureWindows,
sequence,
based attacks OpenBSD
exploited
detected by
mutations
either
SNORT or
IIS
RealSecure
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Attacks
detected
DDoS

Effort to
reduce alarm
rates
(FP and FN)
The article
mentions that
the total
number of
false alarms
were reduced

Brute-Force, Not reported
Synscan,
Portscan

Known
Propose a low
network
FP rate
attacks, DoS
derivatives
XSS attacks 0% FP and 0%
FN rate

Known
SNORT and
ClamAV
signaturebased attacks

Not
mentioned;
focused on
reducing
TIME to
process
signatures, not
FP/FN rates

Brute Force
Attacks

Not discussed

Buffer
Overflows,
DoS, Stack
Overflow,
DT, Double
decoding
(code
execution),

Did not
consider
FP/FN results
because the
goal was to
provide useful
indication
about the

Author

Chou [12]

Source of
data/
benchmark

Web servers
in the Cloud

Heiderich et Web servers
al. [15]

This study
[43]

Web servers
MySQL
database

Environment,
Attributes Metrics used
configuration,
Attacks
of data
in their
virtual
detected
examined
model
machines
before and
Nonafter
exhaustive
mutating data
Signatures

Effort to
reduce alarm
rates
(FP and FN)
average
quality of
signatures
under testing
Data models Increased
Linux, Solaris, Malware
Not discussed;
categorized frequency of Windows VMs (SQL)
focus was
as SaaS,
identified
in Cloud
injection,
more on cloud
PaaS or IaaS SQL
environment
other attacks security
injection
detected with
attacks in
Cloud
SaaS, PaaS,
systems:
and IaaS
DDoS, bruteCloud
force, session
settings
hijacking,
measured in
XSS, etc.
%
innerHTML Page load
VMs running MutationBriefly
properties: time in
Ubuntu
based XSS
suggested as
GET, HTTP milliseconds
attacks
potential
header,
versus the
(mXSS)
future
cookies,
page size
research, but
etc.; mXSS with and
not directly
vectors
without the
addressed
performance
penalty
introduced to
users by
TrueHTML
Signature
Mutation,
VMs running XSS, SQLI, 0% FP and 0%
matching
selection,
Linux or
RFI
FN rate
scheme with chromosome Windows
added
cross-overs
genetic
mutations

2.5 Genetic Algorithm
Data sources and types of detected attacks vary greatly across the body of signature-based IDS
literature. For example, in [48], Avancini et al. examined parameters and values of PHP code to
find XSS attack vectors. These authors use static analysis of the Genetic Algorithm (GA) to
automate the log analysis procedure. They also minimized the false positive and false negative
alarms through path sensitization. Authors of [49] created their own set of suspicious data and used
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the DARPA dataset as the normal dataset for their study. This study was the only study in the
literature we encountered to use the DARPA dataset as a normal dataset. When comparing this
GA-based IDS to a known signature database called Snort, the authors found that the GA-based
IDS outperformed Snort by detecting a higher number of attacks and having a lower false alarm
rate than Snort. Danana et al. [50] obtained all of their data from the KDD99 dataset, and were
able to find attacks including Denial of Service, Probing, User-to-root and Remote-to-local attacks.
A fuzzy genetic algorithm utilized in [51] pulled data from a six-by-six matrix of responseresource entries to measure the parameters of the fitness function.
A multivariate statistical clustering algorithm was suggested to detect web application attacks in
[52]. The discrete variables in the study were measured by frequency and the number of similar
characters between two separate activities (attacks) was suggested as a way to lower the number
of false alarms. Liu and Fang genetically modified two sets of real numbers to shorten the lengths
of the chromosomes to optimize the GA [53]. In another study, network attacks like smurf,
teardrop, neptune, portsweep and others were identified in offline, normal audit data as well as in
real time, processed data [53]. Normal data and attack data were compared by the authors looking
for Denial of Service, Probes, User-to-root and Remote-to-local network-level attacks [54].
Authors of [55] lowered the false alarm rates by implementing an optimal genetic feature selection
process and a support vector machine. Despite the potential of the existing signatures in the
literature to detect patterns across any operating system, this work will use genetic operators to
mutate such patterns for detection. Table 6 summarizes these related works and the methods used
by the authors to reach their conclusions.

Table 6: Comparison of Related Work on Genetic Algorithms
Author

Source of data

Avancini et al.
[48]

Parameters and
values of PHP
code

Barati et al. [49]

Normal dataset
(DARPA) and
suspicious dataset

Metrics

Integrating a static
analysis of the genetic
algorithm and taint
analysis
Number of scan attacks
detected/missed by this
GA-based IDS versus
Snort
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Types of
attacks
Cross-Site
Scripting
attack vectors
Horizontal
and vertical
scan attacks

Effort to reduce
alarm rates
(FP and FN)
FP and FN were
minimized
through path
sensitization
Overall false
alarm rate was
10%

Author

Source of data

Metrics

Types of
attacks

Danane et al. [50]

KDD99 dataset

Accuracy, execution
time, memory allocation

DoS, Probe,
U2R, R2L

Fessi et al. [51]

6 by 6 binary
matrix of
response-resource
entries

Zhou et al. [52]

Multivariate
statistical
clustering
algorithm is
suggested to
detect attacks; No
real data is used
in the study
Two sets of real
numbers are
genetically
modified to
shorten
chromosome
length
Offline data for
normal traffic
dataset [audit
data]; real time
data for attack
detection
[Processed data]
Attack data and
normal data

Rules that only match
anomalous connections
to show signatures,
parameters of fitness
function
Frequency for discrete
variables; the number of
similar characters
between 2 activities

Not specified;
focused on
the fitness
value: attack
impact ratio
Web-layer
attacks under
study, but
none are
specified

Delphi method to
determine Figure 1 in
this article; fitness value
of each chromosome,
total fitness values,
selection probability

No attacks;
discusses
modified
genetic
algorithm for
optimization

Src_bytes, land,
wrong_fragment, [all
numerical] and service
[nominal]

DoS attacks:
smurf, pod,
teardrop,
Neptune,
back,
portsweep

Protocol type, service,
src_bytes, flag,
num_failed_logins,
Logged_in,
srv_diff_host_rate,
dst_host_srv_count,
is_guest_login, and
num_shells

DoS, Probe,
U2R, R2L

Liu et al. [53]

Narsingyani et al.
[54]

Senthilnayaki et
al. [55]

Effort to reduce
alarm rates
(FP and FN)
Rules added in
the testing phase
to reduce FP and
FN
FP rate was
“low” but not
specified
numerically
Not disclosed
but states the
goal is “a very
low rate”

No FP or FN;
studied detection
reliability (R),
time of detection
(T), and
threshold time
(S)
Specifically
focused on FP
rate to improve
performance by
increasing the
number of rules
False alarms
reduced by using
optimal genetic
feature selection
and a support
vector machine

2.6 Benchmarking and Evaluation
Work completed by Alhamazani et al. [56] proposes a benchmark named the Cross-Layer MultiCloud Application Monitoring- and Benchmarking-as-a-Service (CLAMBS). This study used an
Apache web server, a Tomcat web server and a MySQL database. The attack detection approach
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worked across Windows and Linux environments, and was implemented to establish the baseline
performance of applications while also monitoring each application’s quality of service (e.g.,
round trip time, packet loss). In this study, datasets of 50, 100 and 200 MB were generated on a
virtual machine as a proof-of-concept to test Amazon Web Services and Windows Azure.
However, this benchmark also had a heavy reliance on JAVA and specific reliability on cloud
services. As described by [57], a study by Champion et al. [58] utilized an attack detector titled
Ebayes by the authors. This detector was able to detect more attacks at the application layer than
the commercially available intrusion detection system (IDS) in 2001. Despite this, Ebayes still
only detected up to 50% of known attacks in the in-house generated dataset. Athanasiades et al.
[57] also describe a study carried out in 1997 [59]. Through the use of customized software based
on the Tool Command Language Distributed Program (TCL-DP) package, these authors simulated
users performing FTP and/or Telnet procedures. A script was then created to record and replay the
user actions to generate their dataset. These authors used a very controlled environment to ensure
that the results of the study could be replicated. Aside from this precaution, the authors neglected
to test their dataset for attack detection in a normal network environment. Instead, attack detection
was only under study in the stress tests of the data [59].

Using a self-named benchmark, Ballocca et al. [60] created a fully integrated web stressing tool.
The benchmark, called the Customer Behavior Model Graph (CBMG), relies on the stressing tool
that is composed of a script recorder and a load generator. This allowed the traffic from the
workload characterization to be automated and begin from the web log files. Generating this
workload, on the other hand, is time consuming and involves multiple processes. The authors in
[61] developed a unique algorithm to generate the Research Description Framework (RDF)
benchmark. Generating datasets would no longer be an issue if RDF was adopted as a universal
benchmark because the authors state that this generator can convert any dataset (real or fake) into
a benchmark dataset. They can even make sure the user-specific data properties are generated.
While this sounds like a potential solution, the authors also noted that the initial input data must
first be cleaned and normalized. Neto et al. [62] took a trust-based approach to application-layer
attack detection. By defining how likely vulnerabilities were to be found rather than determining
a specific number of attacks that would be found, these authors measured the trustworthiness of
the relationship between the application and the developer. As a new approach, this approach may
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sound simple, but it is full of complex coding and involves a three step process. Anyone wishing
to use this benchmark would require a fundamental understanding of how to read complex
computer code.

In [63], Neto et al. implemented Static Code Analysis as a benchmark for attack detection. Four
metrics were applied to real web applications to determine the trustworthiness of the application.
An application with a high mean score across each of the metrics was deemed untrustworthy.
Despite these efforts, the benchmark relied on the TCP-App standard for web application code and
JAVA. Stuckman et al. [64] crafted a modular benchmark on a testbed that automated the
evaluation of an intrusion prevention system. This benchmark was a collection of modules and
each module had an intentionally vulnerable application installed in an environment that would
allow the application to run and simulate an attack. Each testbed was a deliverable virtual machine,
so anyone could easily deploy the benchmark on any system running Debian Linux. The
benchmark was limited in that it had to be customized for each individual developer if the
developer wanted to generate their own attacks. Another benchmark for attack detection was made
by Zhang et al. [65] in 2009. Known as WPBench, or Web Performance Benchmark for Web 2.0
applications, this benchmark utilized a replay mechanism that was able to simulate user
interactions with applications and characteristics of networks and servers. The benchmark worked
well with Internet Explorer, Firefox, and Google Chrome browsers.

Ultimately, this benchmark was intended to measure the responsiveness of each of the browsers to
page loading times and event response times. The main disadvantage of this proposed benchmark
was that is required users to run the benchmark in the background of their daily browsing activities
and recorded their actions. This benchmark would then take more time to replay the actions in
order to learn the user’s environment and preferences. A Model Driven Architecture (MDA)
approach was proposed in [66] and allowed for the generation of repetitive and complicated
infrastructure code by the benchmark tool. The MDA approach included a core benchmark
application, a load testing suite and performance monitoring tools for the user. However, the
approach did not include any type of tool to collect information regarding data performance. Yet
another benchmark suggested in the literature is a web server benchmark named servload by the
authors of the work [67]. This benchmark supports load balancing, can replay web server logs,
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tells users the number of requests and sessions, as well as provide the connection time and error
counts to the user. All of this information is very useful when trying to establish a standard for
application-layer attack detection, but servload only supports GET requests and has to analyze
web server logs. Varying log formats bring servload to a halt, impeding this benchmark from being
universally adopted. We show the comparison and contrast among these literature works in Table
7. Coupled with this summary, Table 8 highlights the specific data attributes that other authors
measured to evaluate their datasets.
Table 7: Summary of Related Literature on Benchmarking
Author(s)
Alhamazani et
al. [56]

Athanasiades
et al. [57]

Description of
proposed new
model or
benchmark
CLAMBS-CrossLayer Multi-Cloud
Application
Monitoring- and
Benchmarking-asa-Service

Environment
similar to DARPA
1998

Ebayes detector
[58]
Same as above Custom Software
[57]
based on the
Expect and Tool
Command
Language
Distributed
Program (TCLDP) package [59]
Ballocca et al. Customer
[60]
Behavior Model
Graph (CBMG)

Advantages of
method
Monitors QoS of
application
QoS information of
application
components is shared
across cloud layers
Baseline performance
established by
B-a-a-S
Detected more
attacks than the
commercially
available IDS [58]

Environment was
very controlled to
make sure the results
could be replicated

Traffic from the
workload
characterization is
automatic
The characterization
process begins from
the web log files
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Disadvantages of
method
Study a proof-ofconcept on a VM
testing Amazon AWS
and Windows Azure

Size of the
Dataset
Datasets of
50MB, 100
MB and
200MB

Heavy reliance on
JAVA

Not publicly available
(Privacy issues at
Georgia Tech would
not allow researchers
to access their own
subnet)
Attack identification
only took place during
stress tests

Did not
disclose the
size of the
dataset

Creating a workload
takes a lot of time and
involves four different
processes: merging
and filtering web logs,
getting sessions,
transforming sessions,
and CMBGs clustering

No size given

Did not
disclose the
size of the
dataset

Author(s)
Duan et al.
[61]

Neto et al.[62]

Neto et al.[63]

Stuckman et
al. [64]

Zhang et al.
[65]

Description of
proposed new
model or
benchmark
Research
Description
Framework (RDF)

Trust-based
benchmark with 5
metrics: Code
Average Code
Prudence, Code
Average Code
Carelessness,
Quality, Hotspot
Prudence
Discrepancy and
Hotspot
Carelessness
Discrepancy
Static Code
Analysis

Run a modular
benchmark on a
testbed that
automates the
evaluation of the
IPS
WPBench: Web
Performance
Benchmark for
Web 2.0
applications

Advantages of
method

Disadvantages of
method

Size of the
Dataset

This generator can
convert any real or
fake dataset into a
benchmark dataset
and make data with
similar characteristics
as the real dataset
with user-specific
data properties
Defining how likely
vulnerabilities are to
be found rather than
the number of
vulnerabilities

Must perform data
cleaning and
normalization of the
dataset before using
this method

User can
indicate
dataset size

Anyone using this
benchmark method
would have to
understand how to
read code

No set size of
data

Applies all 4 metrics
to real web
applications; higher
metric values mean
the product is less
trustworthy

Relies on TCP-App
standard for code on
web applications
instead of developing
their own

Not disclosed

Testbed can be given
out as a VM, so
anyone can deploy it
with Debian Linux

Replay mechanism
simulates user
interactions with
applications and
characteristics of
servers and networks
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JAVA heavy
Need to make this
customizable for
individual developers
to generate their own
attacks
Requires users to run
the benchmark in the
background of daily
browsing to create a
recording of steps to
replay so the
benchmark learns the
environment and user
preferences

Resulting size
of code; not
specified

38MB

Author(s)
Zhu et al. [66]

Zinke et al.
[67]

Description of
proposed new
model or
benchmark
Model Driven
Architecture
(MDA) approach
Web Server
Benchmark named
servload

Advantages of
method

Disadvantages of
method

Generates repetitive
and complicated
infrastructure code

No tools are included
to collect data
performance

Can replay web
server logs, tells
users the # of
requests, sessions,
connect time, and
error counts; error
counts may be
connection errors,
HTTP codes, or # of
timeouts

Web server logs have
to be analyzed and log
formats can limit this
feature

Size of the
Dataset
Claim a large
amount of
data, but not
specific
No dataset
size

Only supports GET
requests

Table 8: Measured Data Attributes for Benchmarking
Author(s)
Alhamazani et al.
[56]

Athanasiades et al. [57]

Same as above [57]

Ballocca et al. [60]

Duan et al. [61]

Neto et al. [62]

Attributes discussed
Worked on Windows and Linux
Monitoring agent used SNMP, HTTP, SIGAR and custom built APIs
Benchmarking component measured QoS parameters like network
bandwidth, download and upload speeds, and latency
Web server: Apache Tomcat
Database Server: MySQL
Generated traffic like DARPA 1998 [58]
FTP server was the “victim”
Used attack injection programs and in-house tools
Attack effectiveness measured by number of hung connections at the
victim server
Percentage of detected hosts were measured (ranged from 25-50%)
[58]
Simulated users performing Telnet and/or FTP operations [59]
Script was used to record and reply the user actions to generate data
Some attacks used: password files being sent to remote hosts,
password cracking, elevating user access, password dictionary
Fully integrated web stressing tool
Workloads were extracted from web log files
Stressing tool was made up of a script recorder and a load generator
TPC Benchmark H (19 GB) was used as the baseline for this
generator
The authors created a unique algorithm to generate a benchmark
Measured the trustworthiness of the relationship between the
application and the developer
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Author(s)

Neto et al. [63]

Stuckman et al. [64]

Zhang et al. [65]

Zhu et al. [66]
Zinke et al. [67]

Attributes discussed
A 3 step process: user sent parameters (i.e., session token) to the
server and identified a target resource, server processes code, server
sent back output like a form or html text
Raw number of vulnerabilities reported
Calibrated number of vulnerabilities reported
Normalized raw number of vulnerabilities reported
Normalized calibrated number of vulnerabilities reported
Benchmark was a collection of modules that were each within a
vulnerable application in an environment that let the application run
and simulated an attack against the application
Worked with Internet Explorer, Firefox or Chrome
Measured responsiveness of browsers to page loading times and
event response times
Included a core benchmark application, a load testing suite, and
performance monitoring tools
Supported load balancing
Did not ignore think times or different user sessions
Generated higher workloads than SURGE with similar statistical
characteristics through 1 of 3 methods: multiply, peak, or score
method

In the next Chapter, we discuss anomaly intrusion detection, and our proposed technique to
increase the attack detection rate.
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Chapter 3: Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection System
Development
3.1 Overview
This Chapter introduces the anomaly Intrusion Detection System (IDS) development and discusses
some relevant work on anomaly IDS development in Section 3.2. Next, in Section 3.3 we introduce
the idea of detecting web application attacks by using cross-entropy metrics. Section 3.4 explains
our proposed approach to detect such attacks using web application log data based on our previous
publication [30]. Finally, Section 3.5 shows how we compared our measures to other accepted
measures.

3.2 Related Explanation of Anomaly-Based IDS Development
A recent report from Imperva [68] shows many applications have been targeted to exploit known
vulnerabilities such as SQL Injection (SQLI), Remote File Inclusion (RFI), Directory Traversal
(DT), and Cross Site Scripting (XSS). SQL injection attacks attempt to provide part of a SQL
query in a web request URL (parameter value) where the query part is intended to change the
structure of the query to introduce anomalous behaviors [69]. Remote File Inclusion [70] adds
arbitrary server-side source files to introduce unwanted application behaviors. A directory
traversal attack [71] supplies arbitrary traversing of directory commands in supplied URLs. XSS
attacks inject arbitrary JavaScript code and occur when unsanitized inputs are passed within
request URLs and are accepted by applications and processed or stored [72]. The vulnerability
may arise from plugins the application uses during runtime, for example. One million Wordpress
websites have been reported to be vulnerable to SQLI due to leak of secret keys from associated
plugins [73]. Similarly, security protocols used by web applications can play the role for successful
exploitation (e.g., heart bleed bug exploited to reveal secret information from web servers [74]).

IDS is a popular approach to prevent attacks. IDS can be classified into two types based on the
location of deployment: host-based (where one host or computer is protected) and network-based
(where a set of hosts connected to a network is protected). This work considers development of a
host-based IDS. Depending on the type of detection, an IDS can apply signatures of known attacks.
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For example, Snort and Bro are two popular signature-based IDS. Both of these signature-based
IDS have currently available signatures to detect web-based attacks such as SQLI and XSS [38,
75]. However, the limitation of an established signature-based IDS is that they are not suitable for
detecting new attacks and it is common to see attackers devise new signatures to bypass IDS
detection [39, 40]. To address this limitation, anomaly-based IDS have been getting much attention
from the research community [5, 12, 15, 39, 40].

An anomaly-based IDS has learning and detection phases. During the learning phase, it learns
profiles of normal web requests and then compares with a new request to find the dissimilarity
level. If the level exceeds a certain threshold level, an attack is detected. Anomalous IDS has the
advantage of detecting new attacks, but at the cost of a high number of incorrect detections. Thus,
it is important to explore approaches to reduce the number of warnings. Most of the anomalybased IDS analyzing web logs from the literature [5, 12, 15, 39, 40] primarily analyzes GET
requests, and do not consider POST requests. These POST requests include parameter and value
information that should be considered for profiling of requests. Some existing approaches require
the knowledge of source code level information to reduce the number of false warning [5, 20, 39,
43]. However, source code may not be accessible while developing an IDS.

In contrast to earlier works, our approach relies on path resources (e.g., a request page in a certain
path) and does not need to rely on similar assumptions of the other works. We place the emphasis
on web server logs and apply entropy measures to detect anomalous requests. Our work employs
cross entropy levels of parameter name, value, and types for profiling and attack detection.

3.3 Detection of Web Application Attacks with Cross-Entropy
Our approach is motivated by earlier works that apply information theoretic measures. For our
study, we created the framework of the web anomaly IDS for the learning phase. A browser is
used to run deployed web applications and access resource pages with benign input, as illustrated
in Figure 1. All GET requests from the browser get logged into the web server log files. For POST,
we deploy a suitable browser extension (Firebug for Firefox [76]). We combine the POST request
data with GET request data during offline analysis by the anomaly detector. The anomaly detector
learns request profiles based on resource paths.
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Figure 1: Information-theoretic IDS Framework
Figure 2 shows two example requests (we display part of the log due to space constraint) that we
gather during dataset generation by deploying a large scale web application named Joomla [77].
The first request is intended to access the resource /joomla/index.php, and has the list of parameters
such as option, view, task, id, timeout with associated values com_installer, update, update.ajax,
6, and 3600. The second request accesses the same resource as the first one. However, it has one
parameter (option) with the value com_media. Therefore, applications may let a user access the
resource path with various sets of parameters and values. Solely relying on the parameter sequence
would not be enough to detect attacks where the sequence remains the same (e.g., SQL Injection).
We also find that the value of id is related to the user account, and the type of the parameter usually
remains as numeric with no upper or lower bound.

/joomla/index.php?option=com_installer&view=update&task=update.ajax&id=6&skip=700&ti
meout=3600… …
/joomla/index.php?option=com_media …
Figure 2: Example of Log Data
For each of the common paths, the anomaly detector profiles three types of information: parameter
set, parameter value set and parameter value data type. To account for all of these variations within
parameters and their values, our proposed detection approach employs three types of measures.
We now present the processing of each request that appears in a log file in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1: Processing of URLs from a log file

Line 2 identifies the resource path and adds to the R set if not included already (Lines 3-4). Line 5
extracts the list of parameters from the request. For each of the parameters (Lines 6-10), we obtain
the value (Line 7) and type of data (Line 8). Then, we update occurrences of the value and type at
Lines 9 and 10, respectively. Finally, Line 11 updates parameter occurrence.

3.4 Case Study and Evaluation
We apply entropy as the metric to profile the randomness of parameter occurrences, parameter
values, and value types. The entropy (H) is calculated using the formula in Equation (i). Here, Q
is a set of symbols (unique values passed in the parameter), where qi is the ith element, p(qi)
indicates the occurrence probability of qith element.
H(Q) =-E[logP(Q)] = -Ʃq£Q(q = qi) log2 P (q=qi) … … (i)

Since entropy is useful for a single set of frequency distribution, it cannot be directly applied to
compare two distributions (i.e., a new request and a set of earlier observed requests). Instead, we
apply a cross-entropy measure between two distributions. Cross entropy (CE) [78, 79] between
two distributions p and q is shown in Equation (ii). Here, p(xi) is the probability of xith element’s
occurrence.
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CE (p, q) = - Ʃi p(xi) * log2(q(xi)) … … … (ii)

In Equation (ii), p(xi) is the probability of xith element from p set, and q(xi) is the probability of
xith element from q set. CE becomes minimal when p and q are identical. The CE between two
probability distributions measures the average number of bits needed to identify an event from a
set of possibilities. We define a threshold level d which, if exceeded, would flag a new request as
anomalous. If the CE does not exceed threshold, we consider it normal request. For web anomaly
detection, we deploy three measures: cross-entropy of parameter (CEP), cross-entropy of value
(CEV), cross-entropy of type (CET). CEP is intended to measure the missing parameter or
additional parameters injected as part of attacks or tampering. Equation (iii) shows CE between
two parameter sets P1 and P2 for a given resource path r. We apply a back off smoothing algorithm
[80] to avoid the zero occurrence of any parameter by replacing zero with a very small probability
value (as the logarithm of zero probability cannot be computed, otherwise).
CEPr (P1, P2) = - Ʃi P1(xi) * log2(P2(xi)) … … … (iii)
CEV is intended for a given parameter’s observed values during the training. It compares the
distribution of earlier observed values and the values present in a new request. It can capture any
deviation between anomalous attack inputs with an earlier observed normal input. Equation (iv)
shows the CEV between V1 (values observed during profiling) and V2 (value observed during
testing) for a given parameter p.
CEVp (V1,V2) = - Ʃi V1(xi) * log2(V2(xi)) … … … (iv)

CET is intended to reduce false positives as well as increase attack detection. It observes the
deviation between data type of the supplied parameter values and a new request parameter value
type. Equation (v) shows CET between type set T1 and T2 for a given resource path r.
CETr (T1, T2) = - Ʃi T1(xi) * log2(T2(xi)) … … … (v)
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These metrics were applied to both of the datasets in our study, the training dataset and the testing
dataset. For the training phase, we deploy a large scale PHP Content Management System (Joomla
[77]) and perform various functionalities for a four day period. For each day, various types of
inputs have been applied to different pages and the logs are stored. We ensured that the data does
not contain any malicious input by manually inspecting the logs. We then use the first day of data
to build a normal profile of requests and then validate for false positive rates for the subsequent
three days of datasets. Table 9 shows the number of GET and POST requests for all four days. We
combine all the data, and then choose 25% of the data randomly for building profiles, while
keeping the remaining 75% of the data for testing.

Table 9: Good Dataset Characteristics
Request Type Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4
GET
1,013
1,556
1,640
1,536
POST
412
517
511
481
Total
1,425
2,073
2,151
2,017
We gather attack input from various sources [81-83] and apply them to the deployed application
to generate the attack dataset. Table 10 shows the number of samples we applied in our attack
dataset generation. These attack inputs are applied randomly within web requests from the
browser.
Table 10: Distribution of Attack Inputs
Attack type # of samples
SQLI [83]
1000
DT [71, 82]
8
RFI [70]
5
XSS [81]
60
Total
1073
When the IDS generates a warning we call it positive, if it is real, we call it True Positive (TP). If
no warning is generated we call it negative, if it is actually not a malicious request, we call it True
Negative (TN). If the IDS misses the actual attack detection, we call it False Negative (FN). We
follow similar approaches [39, 40] to evaluate the performance of the proposed approach. We use
a Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve to evaluate the performance of the anomaly
IDS. It has two measures: True Positive Rate (TPR) on the y axis, and False Positive Rate (FPR)
on the x axis. TPR and FPR are defined as follows:
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TPR = TP/(TP+FN) … … … (viii)

FPR=FP/(FP+TN)

… … … (ix)

Ideally, we expect IDS to demonstrate a TPR of 100%, while FPR would be 0%. The filtered
(normal and attack input free) data is used to evaluate an IDS to produce FPR, whereas the dataset
containing only attack requests would be used to obtain TPR. Table 11 shows that the lowest FPR
is observed for CEV (0.53%) while the highest FPR is for the CET (3.6%). The lowest TPR
observed is 83.66 (CEP) while the highest TPR is obtained for all measures when considering
higher threshold levels (d>8). The raw results are presented in Table 11.

Table 11: FPR and TPR for the Proposed Measures
CEP
CEV
CET
d FPR(%) TPR(%) FPR(%) TPR(%) FPR(%) TPR(%)
d >2 0.54 83.66 0.53 90.22
1.2
94.21
d >4 1.1
92.45 1.45 94.53 1.45 95.67
d>6 1.26 98.67 1.67 99.33 2.56 98.67
d>8 2.56
100
1.92
100
3.6
100
Data from Table 11 is also below in Figure 3. The Figure shows the ROC curve of performance
for the IDS for various distance (d) values. In this graph, the x axis shows FPR (%) and the y axis
shows TPR (%). We find that a higher detection accuracy is achieved at the cost of a higher FPR.
Among CEP, CEV, and CET, the best performance is shown by CEV as it has the lowest FPR.

Figure 3: ROC Curve of various Cross Entropy Metrics
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3.5 Comparison of Related Metrics
We compare our approach with two earlier proposed approaches: value length and Mahalanobis
distance [31]. The length of a parameter value should be limited in size. However, for an attack
request, it may be higher. We compute mean and variance of length during training and testing.
We measure the deviation based on Chebyshev's inequality (calculating the probability that an
attribute would have the observed length) [84]. Let X be a random variable with mean µ and
standard deviation s >0. Then the Chebyshev Inequality is shown as follows (k>0):
P(|X-µ| >= ks) ≤ 1/k2 … … … (vi)

Mahalanobis Distance (MD) [85] is a metric to compare two statistical distributions. It indicates
how close a given distribution is to observed distributions. If we assume the two groups are x (x1,
x2, …xn) and y (y1, y2, … yn). Then MD between x and y is defined as follows:
MD(x, y) = sqrt ((x-y)T*S-1 *(x-y)) … … … (vii)
Sqrt is the square root operation, (x-y)T is the transpose of the difference between x and y, S-1 is the
inverse of co-variance matrix S. We adopt the length measures and consider the length of the
parameter name, and the value and consider k=4 for Chebyshev inequality. For MD, we form
groups based on parameter, value, and type (e.g., each unique parameter, value, or type is labeled
with a numeric value, for example, a data type for number is 1, while string is 2). The following
ROC curves (Figures 4, 5 and 6) compare CE measures from our case study with length and MDbased anomaly detection approaches. We find CEP performs better than length and MD.

Figure 4: Comparison between CEP, length and MD measures
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Figure 5: Comparison between CEV, length and MD measures

Figure 6: Comparison between CET, length and MD measures
Among the three measures (CEP, CEV, CET), CEV performs best followed by CEP and CET
when compared with length and MD measures. CEV accounted for payload diversity more than
the other two measures. In all cases, we find that the cross entropy measure performs better than
two other existing anomaly detection measures. As anomaly detection measures become more
capable of detecting advanced web application attacks, the signature-based approach to attack
detection must also be investigated.

The next Chapter discusses how a signature-based IDS can work with a genetic algorithm and
improve attack detection. Another case study will also be included.
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Chapter 4: Signature-Based Intrusion Detection System
Development
4.1 Overview
In this Chapter, we establish our methodology for creating a genetic algorithm that is applicable
to signature-based intrusion detection in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, we describe how datasets are
generated and applied. Finally, Section 4.4 presents our case study and results.

Traditional Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) use signatures where attacks are defined as a
sequence of events to match with network traffic [86]. This approach is accurate as long as the list
of attacks is known in advance and signatures are defined before deploying an IDS such as Snort
[87] and Bro [88]. There has been little effort to develop signature-based IDS for web applications.
Moreover, they rely on regular expressions to detect attacks. For example, a script created to use
a PHPIDS [89] allows attack signatures to be expressed using a set of regular expressions. The
burden is on the user to keep up with new expressions. To address this limitation of a signaturebased IDS, in this paper, we propose to develop a Genetic Algorithm (GA) based IDS. GA-based
approaches have gained the attention of the research community in recent years. In a signaturebased attack detection approach, the network traffic is monitored and the IDS searches for
malicious behaviors that match the known signatures [4]. Any signatures with even minor
deviations from the attack descriptions would not set off any security alarms, which may leave a
system vulnerable [38]. However, a GA-based approach can address this limitation by generating
new signatures from existing signatures. We explored this idea and carried out a case study [42]
to exemplify how a GA can improve attack detection rates as well.

4.2 Creation of a Genetic Algorithm
Within this Section, we explain how to create a genetic algorithm, based on previous literature.
Generally speaking, a genetic algorithm advances a set of solutions by combining good solutions
to craft new ones until the best solution is found. This process is composed of multiple steps [9093]. In order to generate a genetic algorithm, a general process and set of steps can be followed.
The first step is to create an initial population. This population is typically generated in a random
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manner and may include as many individuals as preferred, from a few to several thousand. An
individual is also called a chromosome in the population. Each chromosome in the initial
population is then evaluated for fitness. Next, a new population has to be created. This process
consists of repeating the steps that use genetic operators, including selection, crossover and
mutation, until the new population is established.

During the selection phase, the main goal is to keep the best individuals in the population and
improve the overall population fitness. Two parent chromosomes are selected from the population
based on their fitness score value. The better the fitness score is, the more likely that the
chromosome will be selected for the population. Crossing over, or the sharing of information, takes
place between two parents to create new offspring or children. This occurs in hopes of crossing
two chromosomes with a high fitness value that will then create an offspring that has the best traits
from each parent chromosome. When mutations occur, there are random changes that happen in
individual genes. This increases the diversity among the initial population over multiple
generations. All of the new offspring are placed into a new population and serve as the base
population for the next iteration of the genetic algorithm. Genetic algorithms are used to create
repetitive populations until the optimum solution for the population is found or the population’s
end condition is reached [91-93]. The genetic algorithm steps are outlined in Figure 7.

1. Begin with a random set of solutions (represented by chromosomes) to form population.
2. Evaluate the fitness of each chromosome in the population.
3. Create new solution by using genetic operators (selection, cross over) by selecting
chromosomes having higher fitness level.
4. Apply mutations randomly on newly generated chromosomes.
5. Repeat steps 2-4 until we reach maximum number of iterations, or exceed population size.
Figure 7: Steps of Genetic Algorithm

4.3 Dataset Generation for GA-Based IDS Development and Application
As our goal is to apply the GA to improve a signature-based IDS, we start with an attack dataset
that we generated by deploying a large scale PHP web application named Joomla [77]. The
applications interacted automatically using scripts, and were provided with malicious inputs. We
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collected inputs from the sources such as OWASP [94]. These attack inputs are applied randomly
within web requests from a browser. Table 12 displays the number of each type of attack that was
distributed into the attack dataset. The Apache web server logs were referenced to manually detect
successful attacks. Figure 8 shows an example of log data for a SQL injection attack where an
input field (id) has a tautology attack encoded in hexa-decimal format. Similarly, Figure 9 shows
an example of log data for an XSS attack where an image source has been supplied with malicious
code. Finally, Figure 10 shows an example of log data for a RFI attack, where the FORMAT field
is included with an include statement pointing to a file source from an attacker-controlled website,
followed by an exit() command.
Table 12: Distribution of Attack Input Data
Attack type
# of samples
SQLI
1000
RFI
5
XSS
60
Total
1073
"GET
/sqlinj/?id=1%27+or+%271%27+%3D+%271%27%29%29%2F*&Submit=Submit&user_token
=c14e5f424d9f279c19ba507492745d50…
Figure 8: Example Log Data for SQL Injection Attack

"GET
/xss_r/?name=%3CIMG+SRC%3DJaVaScRiPt%3Aalert%28%26quot%3BXSS%26quot%3B%
29%3E&user_token=f37e5a82a994725092fd3155bb8cffba…
Figure 9: Example Log Data for XSS Attack
“GET /?FORMAT={${include("http://www.verybadwebsite.com/hacker.txt")}}{${exit()}}…
Figure 10: Example Log Data for RFI Attack

Step 1: The GA accepts a set of chromosomes as input, and provides another set of chromosomes
as outputs after a certain number of iterations while following the fitness evaluation, cross over
and mutations. For our contribution, we first convert each of the GET requests to a chromosome,
which is a bit string representation. Figure 11 shows an example representation of a chromosome
for SQL injection attack (based on the log in Figure 8 above). Here, we have three blocks of
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information that include total number of SQL keywords (two of them include OR, =), presence of
an encoded character (1=Yes, 0=No), number of input fields that have SQL keywords (one field
here has a SQL keyword). The last block is the decision block, which represents attack type,
expressed in four bits. In the literature, there are six common types of SQL injection attacks.
Hence, we reserve three bits to express various types of attacks.

# of SQL
Presence of
# of fields with Attack
keywords encoded character SQL keyword
type
010
1
001
0001
Figure 11: Example of a Chromosome (C1) for SQL Injection
Since each chromosome length should be same across different types of attacks, we define
chromosomes for XSS and RFI using three blocks of bit representation, followed by attack type
information. Figure 12 shows an example of chromosome for XSS based on the XSS log data
described earlier. Here, three script/html words are present (<script>, <img>, </script>), the input
is encoded, and one field has XSS keywords. Figure 13 shows an example of RFI chromosome
based on the RFI log data presented, where the attack payload includes one URL, and it was not
encoded. There is only one command included for this situation. Once each attack has the
appropriate binary string, Step 2 can begin.

# of script/html
Presence of
# of fields with Attack type
keywords
encoded character
XSS keyword
011
1
001
0111
Figure 12: Example of a Chromosome (C2) for XSS Attack
# of URLs
Encoded
# of commands Attack type
001
0
001
1100
Figure 13: Example of a Chromosome (C3) for RFI Attack
Steps 2 and 3: We define two fitness functions (FF2, FF3) to evaluate chromosome x as follows
(Equation (i) to (iii)).
FF1(x): # of attacks detected by x in training dataset/total # of attacks in training data … … (i)
FF2(x): # of attacks detected by x in testing dataset/total # of attacks in testing data … … (ii)
FF3(x): FF1(x) + FF2(x) … … … (iii)
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For example, we can apply FF3 to evaluate the fitness value of a SQLI chromosome (C1). If we
assume that C1 matches with 1 attack input out of 100 samples, and results in no false positive
warning, then its fitness value is 0.01. When we are evaluating the fitness function for a
chromosome, we are considering the entire dataset including training and testing. We compare bit
level representation of chromosomes from training or testing data to determine how many attacks
are detected. The chromosomes are crossed over based on fitness level. We apply one point cross
over for this case study. For instance, if we decide to cross over between C1 and C2, the before
and after results would mimic those added below. If we assume in C1 (after cross over), the fourth
bit gets mutated from 1 to 0, then we have a new signature (01000010111) for XSS, where the
attack payload is not encoded. This cross over process is illustrated below as well.

C1
C2

Before cross over (C1, C2):
010
1
00 1
011
1
00 1

0001
0111

C1
C2

After cross over (C1, C2):
010
1
00 1
011
1
00 1

0111
0001

Step 4: Our proposed framework allows for the web log data to be converted to chromosomes, as
demonstrated. The GA is then applied to generate more chromosomes which act as new attack
signatures until the solution is achieved. The generic framework we applied is shown below in
Figure 14.

Figure 14: GA-Based IDS Framework
4.4 Case Study and Evaluation
In this Section, we evaluate our approach in multiple ways. First, the GA parameters were
evaluated. We divide our attack dataset (web log files) into two parts: training dataset (30%) and
testing dataset (70%). This division is based on some earlier literature work that also developed a
GA-Based classifier (see Table 3). For each of the training dataset logs, we convert GET or POST
47

requests into chromosome representations by editing and implementing a number of open source
PHP class files [95]. Figure 15 shows a screenshot of the application output used while evaluating
this approach on a Windows Computer.

Figure 15: Screenshot of Results from GA-Based IDS

Based on the variables involved, such as the mutation rates, fitness functions and cross overs,
multiple scenarios were carried out to evaluate our approach. These results are depicted in this
Section. Figure 16 shows attack detection accuracy for various population sizes while using FF2
as the fitness function and keeping the mutation rate at 0.5. We can observe that the higher the
selection rate for a chromosome to cross over, the better accuracy for attack detection capability
we achieve. Figure 17 shows the attack detection accuracy for various population sizes while using
FF3 as the fitness function and keeping the mutation rate at 0.7. Each chromosome had varying
selection rates, which makes it easy to see that attacks are detected with more accuracy as the
population size increases and the selection rate increases.
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Figure 16: Attack Detection Accuracy vs. Population Size (FF2, mutation rate=0.5)

Figure 17: Attack Detection Accuracy vs. Population Size (FF3, mutation rate=0.7)

Figure 18 demonstrates that as mutation rate changes, so does the accuracy of attack detection.
Here, the selection rate was set at 10% and FF2 was used as the fitness function. A higher mutation
rate implies that the attacks can be detected with more accuracy and within a smaller population.
Figure 19 illustrates that as mutation rate increases, so does the attack detection accuracy. For this
situation, FF3 was used as the fitness function and the selection rate was set at 20%. A higher
mutation rate shows that the attacks can be detected with more accuracy and in a smaller
population.
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Figure 18: Attack Detection Accuracy vs. Mutation Rate (FF2, selection rate=10%)

Figure 19: Attack Detection Accuracy vs. Mutation Rate (FF3, selection rate=20%)
Despite obtaining the expected results, we continued with our case study a step further. We
compared the GA-Based IDS with PHPIDS [89], which is a popular open source web application
level attack detector. PHPIDS relies on a set of regular expressions in a configuration file to detect
known signatures. Such regular expressions are the signatures of each attack under study.
Therefore, by testing a known attack dataset, we compare GA with PHPIDS. Figures 20-22 below
illustrate samples of the regular expressions provided in PHPIDS for XSS, SQLI and RFI. In
Figure 20, any script code can be detected that is pre or post pended with an arbitrary string
(“(?:\<scri)|(<\w+:\w+)]”). It can also detect data having possible scripts (other than <strong> tag).
Similarly, Figure 21 shows an example regular expression that is supposed to detect SQL injection
attack inputs having specific keywords (e.g., exists, type). Figure 22 shows an example of a regular
expression for remote file inclusion that looks for a php file.

<![CDATA[(?:\<\w*:?\s(?:[^\>]*)t(?!rong)) | (?:\<scri)|(<\w+:\w+)]]>
Figure 20: Regular Expression for Cross-Site Scripting
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<![CDATA[(?:\[\$(?:ne|eq|lte?|gte?|n?in|mod|all|size|exists|type|slice|or)\])]]>
Figure 21: Regular Expression for SQL Injection
<![CDATA[(?:@[\w]+\s*\()|(?:]\s*\(\s*["!]\s*\w)|(?:<[?%](?:php)?.*(?:[?%]>)?)|(?:;[\s\w|]*\$\w
+\s*=)|(?:\$\w+\s*=(?:(?:\s*\$?\w+\s*[(;])|\s*".*"))|(?:;\s*\{\W*\w+\s*\()]]>
Figure 22: Remote File Inclusion Example
To compare the GA-Based IDS with PHPIDS, we consider the population set generated by GA
and then convert back to string representation of attack inputs. We then pass these inputs to
PHPIDS and see if all of them can be detected by PHPIDS. Figures 23 and 24 show example
performances of the PHPIDS. In both cases, as the GA generated a greater population (of
signatures), the PHPIDS failed to detect all of them. Thus, a GA can be complementary to a
PHPIDS to detect new attacks using a signature-based approach.

Figure 23: Performance of PHPIDS for GA Generated Signatures (cross over rate=10%,
mutation rate=0.5)

Figure 24: Performance of PHPIDS for GA Generated Signatures (cross over rate=20%,
mutation rate=0.7)
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The initial results find that the use of a GA is promising and can act as complementary to other
existing signature-based IDS approaches. When the population size of chromosomes is increased
(representing rules), the better the GA achieves the capability of detecting new attacks. Further,
having increased selection rate and mutation rate, we can generate new attack detection rules that
can address the limitation of traditional signature-based IDSs, such as the PHPIDS.

In the next Chapter, a broad summary of benchmark evaluation is presented and applied to a
selection of the previous log files.
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Chapter 5: Benchmark for Evaluation
5.1 Overview
Technologists and computer scientists need a set of standards, called a benchmark, to evaluate the
datasets they handle on a daily basis that may be made up of log files generated by user actions,
web applications, and login attempts. These types of datasets may vary in size, content, purpose,
and many other characteristics. However, all of the datasets should be able to be evaluated by the
same benchmark. For the purposes of this chapter, we consider a benchmark to be a set of data
obtained from real world applications and that can be used to measure performance of web
application attack detection tools. The benchmark could be used to detect how resistant an
application is towards detecting attacks and performance changes [96, 97]. Benchmarking can be
carried over into almost any domain of technology; however, this chapter focuses on developing a
benchmark for detecting attacks against web applications.

5.2 Description of a Benchmark
A benchmark can be applied to nearly any situation in the technology field. Based on the literature
dating back to 1997 and as far forward as 2015, this section will explain why the need for one
collective benchmark is a relevant issue. Strictly by definition, any attack aimed at the application
layer of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model is a web application attack [98]. These
application-layer attacks often involve a web server and/or a database server, depending on the
specific type of attack. To exemplify this, consider XYZ-WebTech, a technology company located
within the United States. At this company, a benchmark would be needed that could be applied to
web application security testing. However, this company would also need a separate benchmark
to apply to web service performance monitoring. The body of literature surrounding benchmarking
discusses the lack of one universal benchmark to detect web application attacks. Currently, the fact
that there is no benchmark for web application attack detection has led authors to develop their
own benchmarks for their specific datasets [56, 57, 58, 60, 62]. A discussion of why the
disadvantages of each approach outweigh their respective advantages is still to come. In addition,
the reasons authors in the literature attempted to establish their own benchmarks will be explained
in more detail in the next section.
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5.3 Motivations for an Application Layer Benchmark
Once a benchmark is created, such as the MIT Lincoln Lab dataset for detecting network-layer
attacks from 1998 [99], the attackers find new avenues to explore. This process is nearly cyclic in
nature since attackers are continuously looking for different ways to access important information,
such as web server or database server logs. Such logs may hold highly sensitive information
including company passwords, client credit card data or employee payroll information, for
instance. Measures such as intrusion detection systems are in place to prevent such actions, but no
benchmark is available to evaluate the efficacy of the detection systems. Relevant characteristics
of the numerous benchmarks that independent studies have instituted must be considered when
developing a benchmark for detecting application layer attacks.

Among the benchmarks individual authors have proposed in the literature, all authors agree that
there is no current benchmark for evaluating datasets for web application layer attack detection.
For instance, for authors working with cloud-based datasets, it is stated that existing monitoring
frameworks such as Amazon CloudWatch, do not monitor all of an application’s components [56].
Since the release of the DARPA dataset in 1998 and similar datasets in surrounding years, no
updated datasets have been published as a benchmark. The datasets published in the 1990s are
irrelevant now. Specifically for this chapter, the DARPA dataset [99] or the KDD Cup dataset
[100] are not only outdated, but also focused on network layer level attacks rather than the web
application layer. Two examples of the multiple network layer attacks are depicted in the Figures
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below. Figure 25 shows the steps involved in an Apache2 attack, and Figure 26 illustrates how a
User-to-Root attack would occur.

Figure 25: An Apahce2 Attack Illustration
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Figure 26: User-to-Root Attack Diagram
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Attacks such as the previous examples cause issues at the network layer, but are not the same
attacks leading to havoc at the application layer. Due to this situation, authors have transitioned
towards crafting their own benchmark in a controlled environment [57]. Common characteristics
of benchmarks across the literature included a consistent focus on application-layer attack
detection by training and testing their datasets. During a training phase, the researchers would use
normal day-to-day logs generated by user activities and regular business actions that were
simulated on a web server and/or database server. Testing datasets were often the datasets that
contained malicious data that researchers placed into the normal data. This was done so that the
researchers, regardless of their objectives, could easily observe if the attacks were detected by their
benchmark application or not. Similarly, our case studies used training and testing data as well.
The observed dissimilarities can demonstrate what should be the best suitable application and
potential scope for the benchmark. For example, a few of the benchmarks proposed to detect
application-layer attacks, or data security breaches, were heavily reliant on complex coding
schemes [62] and using JAVA platforms posed issues as well [56, 63].

5.4 Generating Data and Setting up a Test Environment
An environment that is used to generate data has to be very controlled to ensure that no attacks can
be introduced into the setting. For this chapter, the benchmark datasets were generated through the
use of a virtual machine cluster using VMware Workstation 12 on the host machine [101]. The
host machine is a 64-bit standalone server running an AMD FX 8350 eight core processor at 4Ghz,
contains 32 GB of physical memory and 64 GB of virtual memory. The operating system on the
host machine is Windows 7 Ultimate. Figure 27 is a diagram showing the environment that was
used for this data generation process. Having a virtual setting for the benchmark generation
provides an additional layer of defense against any out-of-network traffic. Thus, the resulting web
application traffic was all generated by the user actions and the benchmark was known to be free
of application layer attack attempts.

Some of the virtual environments had a Windows 7 operating system while others ran on a Linux
operating system. This variation in the operating system was utilized to make sure the benchmark
was applicable to machines with Windows and Linux environments. All security features, such as
antivirus and firewalls, were deactivated to allow for the generation of attack data. Each virtual
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environment had the same baseline software installed including Microsoft Office and Notepad++
and Google Chrome served as the default web browser.

Figure 27: The Environment for Data Generation
In addition to the baseline software, a popular open source software named XAMPP was added to
each virtual environment. This web application works across operating systems and incorporates
Apache, MySQL, PHP and PERL. To generate datasets in the controlled environment, Apache
was used as the web server and MySQL was used as the database management system.
Implementation of the PHP and PERL features of the application were beyond the scope of this
thesis work. Both the Apache web server and the MySQL database management system kept logs
of information about what was occurring on the system while XAMPP was running. A total of five
web applications were installed on the virtual machine cluster, and the user was only accessing
one web application at a time. The web applications that were installed on the virtual cluster were
all open source applications and already integrated with the XAMPP software. These applications
had various functions, which led to the creation of different types of data over the course of four
days for the final benchmarking dataset.
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5.5 Evaluating the Benchmark
Multiple web applications were launched in the virtual environments, but the initial benchmark
was used to evaluate the detection capabilities of the IDS. This data, generated solely from the
content management system application Joomla, was comprised of basic user action logs and
utilized to merge with known attack data. Attack data was generated by executing and re-executing
many known web application layer attacks. The specific virtual environment for this case study
was running a Windows 7 operating system without any antivirus, firewall, or other known
security features. A lack of security software in a virtual, otherwise completely controlled, setting
is required to lower the number of false positive results obtained during the evaluation process.

An anomaly-based IDS is used in this case study to determine which data in the combined datasets
should be flagged as potential attacks against a web application. As described earlier in Chapter 3,
entropy is a measure that falls under the category of information theoretic metrics. The entropy
level of normalized traffic from the Content Management System was represented by a limit (X)
to create a cut-off point. Any traffic with an entropy level above the pre-determined limit was
considered anomalous and thus an attack against the Content Management System web
application. A data security breach would be an example of an outcome from this type of attack.
For the purposes of comparing the probability distributions of the normal traffic and attack traffic
to one another, a cross-entropy measure was used. The normal data is also referred to as the learned
profile because this data was utilized to establish the benchmark. In contrast, the attack dataset is
also called the new requests because such data was not introduced to the benchmark prior to the
evaluation step.

To test a new request, the cross entropy between the learned profile and the new request is
measured. A high level of cross entropy is considered malicious for this study. Based on the
characteristics of the preliminary dataset from the Content Management System application, three
cross entropy measures from Chapter 3 were employed: cross entropy for parameter (CEP), cross
entropy for value (CEV) and cross entropy for value data type (CET). The preliminary results of
this case study showed that the lowest false positive rate (FPR) was observed for CEV while the
highest FPR was for the CET. False positive rates ranged from less than 1% to about 4%. The
lowest true positive rate (TPR) observed was for the CEP equating to almost 84 % of those results.
59

Additionally, the highest TPR was obtained for all measures when considering higher threshold
levels. Given that previous literature states the average anomaly detection IDS has a FPR of 8.4%
[41, 49], we can report that this benchmark allowed us to reach our objective of lowering the FPR
to under 4%. Based on the preliminary evidence, cross entropy was a valid metric for the
benchmark datasets.

Since the conclusions contain only results from the case study using the Content Management
System logs, these case study results cannot be generalized across all web applications for attack
detection approaches. To empirically evaluate the entire set of log files from all five of the
deployed web applications, another case study would have to be carried out, allowing the
benchmark to be applied to all of the log files that were generated after the final submission of the
case study [30]. If additional web application log files are included in benchmark evaluation, the
empirical conclusion would be further supported and extended to multiple applications based on
the initial findings in the study. Figure 28 shows the set up for the continuation of the case study
with examples of open source PHP applications.

Figure 28: Web Applications Deployed in Apache and Stored in MySQL

The following Chapter demonstrates the output from Apache logs for these web applications and
additional tools used during the course of this work.
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Chapter 6: Implementation and Testing
6.1

Anomaly Detection

For the context of this section of the Chapter, it is important to revisit Chapter 3 and review the
case study we conducted. Our approach was used to detect the occurrence of specific attacks
including SQLI, RFI, DT and XSS. We used measures of cross entropy to detect anomalies in the
dataset. Cross entropy was calculated for parameters, values and value types, as illustrated in
Figures 29 and 30. The resource path in the first line of Figure 29 would be /joomla/index.php.
The parameter of this resource path is controller followed by the value config.display and the value
type is config. Similarly, in Figure 30, the last GET request would be parsed into its parameters
(post, action, message) and values (207, edit, 6). Figure 30 would not have any value types.

Figure 29: Content Management System Log Entries

Figure 30: Blogging Platform Log Entries
Figure 29 shows an example of normal traffic as GET entries from the Apache server’s log file
generated by the content management system application named Joomla. Figure 30 shows both
GET and POST requests. The last GET request is posting a message by a user. The POST examples
are related to the image that the user uploaded to the blog application. Each log entry, including
training and testing data, was parsed in this manner through the use of the algorithm we described
earlier. Once each entry was broken down into its parameters, values and types, the previously
described cross entropy equations were applied to the data. Overall, the cross entropy of the data
parameters showed the lowest performance, with a true positive rate of 83.66%. In contrast, the
cross entropy of data values was the best measure in the study, producing a false positive rate
below 1% (see Table 11). The implementation and testing of this approach outperformed both
measures from previous literature as well.
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6.2

Signature Detection

The subject matter and discussion in this section is a reflection of the study presented in Chapter
4. We completed the signature-based approach case study with the same datasets as those used in
our anomaly case study, but did not have any DT attacks in the attack dataset during that time. Our
technique for detecting signatures employed a genetic algorithm. For each log entry, we applied
the algorithm and transformed the data into a binary string. These binary strings, or chromosomes,
were used to identify the signature of the attacks. A screenshot of the genetic algorithm output was
presented earlier (see Figure 15). We utilized methods explained in Chapter 4, such as changing
cross over rates and mutation rates, to increase the variability of the attack signatures. Through the
use of our genetic algorithm to create new attack signatures, our detection rates were increased
relative to other literature in the field.
All of the logs from the Content Management System were used to make new signatures. However,
we deployed many applications after the initial case study, as mentioned. Shortened samples of
normal traffic from the Apache web server logs of the other applications are presented in the
Figures below to illustrate the variability across the final dataset. Specifically, the deployed
applications consisted of a content management system, a blogging platform, a bulletin board
system, a classifieds marketplace, and an e-commerce platform. In Figure 31, the POST log shows
that an entry was deleted from the bulletin board while one of the GET requests demonstrates the
user browsing the forum. Figure 32 provides evidence of the user conducting searches and adding
content to the classifieds application. Finally, Figure 33 illustrates the user browsing the various
pages of the e-commerce application by generating GET requests.

Figure 31: Bulletin Board System Log Entries

Figure 32: Classifieds Marketplace Log Entries
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Figure 33: E-commerce Platform Log Entries
Attack data was made up of the aforementioned attacks that we successfully simulated. Figure 34
illustrates a small sample of SQL injection attacks that we purposefully introduced to the IDS
during testing. Here, the main log information would be the SQL keywords (select-from-where,
etc.) and database changes that can be seen in Apache logs. The provided Figure demonstrates an
attacker sending a query to discover which users are super users based on the privilege type the
user has in the user privilege table.

Figure 34: Malicious Data Composed of SQL Injections
In the next Chapter, we present the dissemination of our research results thus far into the work.
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Chapter 7: Dissemination of Research Results
This chapter illustrates the dissemination of results, such as published conference papers and other
works completed for this thesis. Below we list the title, abstract, and venue for each dissemination.

7.1 Information Theoretic Anomaly Detection Framework for Web Applications
Robert Bronte, Hossain Shahriar and Hisham Haddad. Conference Proceedings. Proc. of 40th
IEEE International Computer and Software Application (COMPSAC), Atlanta, GA June 10-14,
2016, pp. 394-399. Doi: 10.1109/COMPSAC.2016.139 [30]
Abstract
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a popular approach to detect attacks in web applications.
Signature-based IDS may not know all possible attack signatures in advance, thus a
complementary anomaly-based IDS is deployed to and detect new attacks. In this paper, we
propose an anomaly detection approach that utilizes three measures: cross entropy for parameter,
value, and data type. The measures are intended to compare the deviation between learned request
profiles and a new web request. To reduce the number of incorrect detections, we consider requests
accessing similar resource paths to learn entropy parameter’s value. We evaluate this approach by
generating log datasets from a large scale web application (Content Management System). The
initial results show that the proposed approach can detect all malicious web requests and
demonstrate lower false positive rates. It outperformed when comparing two other approaches:
length of parameter value and Mahalanobis Distance.

7.2 A Signature-Based Intrusion Detection System for Web Applications based on Genetic
Algorithms
Robert Bronte, Hossain Shahriar and Hisham Haddad. Conference Proceedings. Proceedings of
the 9th International Conference on Security of Information and Networks (SIN '16), July 2016,
NJ, USA, ACM, pp. 32-39. Doi:10.1145/2947626.2951964 [43]
Abstract
Web application attacks are an extreme threat to the world’s information technology
infrastructure. A web application is generally defined as a client-server software application where
the client uses a user interface within a web browser. Most users are familiar with web application
attacks. For instance, a user may have received a link in an email that led the user to a malicious
website. The most widely accepted solution to this threat is to deploy an Intrusion Detection
System (IDS). Such a system currently relies on signatures of the predefined set of events
matching with attacks. Issues still arise as all possible attack signatures may not be defined before
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deploying an IDS. Attack events may not fit with the pre-defined signatures. Thus, there is a need
to detect new types of attacks with a mutated signature-based detection approach. Most traditional
literature works describe signature-based IDSs for application layer attacks, but several works
mention that not all attacks can be detected. It is well known that many security threats can be
related to software or application development and design or implementation flaws. Given that
fact, this work expands a new method for signature-based web application layer attack detection.
We apply a genetic algorithm to analyze web server and database logs and the log entries. The
work contributes to the development of a mutated signature detection framework. The initial
results show that the suggested approach can detect specific application layer attacks such as
Cross-Site Scripting, SQL Injection and Remote File Inclusion attacks.
7.3 Benchmark for Empirical Evaluation of Web Application Anomaly Detectors
Robert Bronte, Hossain Shahriar and Hisham Haddad. Book Chapter. Benchmark for Empirical
Evaluation of Web Application Anomaly Detectors. Empirical Research for Software Security:
Foundations and Experience (under review), [Editors: L. Othmane, M. Jaatun and E. Weippl].
[101]
Abstract
Designing a benchmark that is applicable to a wide range of datasets is not a simple task. Before
any benchmark can be established, the training and testing data has to be generated. The generation
of a dataset is accomplished in controlled environments in most studies [65-67]. Within such
datasets, the data consists of typical user actions on web applications that represent normal traffic
on the network. By normal data, we mean that no attacks are occurring on the network during the
data generation process. An attack-free environment is crucial in order to generate normal data,
which creates the need for controlled study environments. Some examples of common user actions
on web applications that are logged by the web server and/or database server are login attempts,
edits to a Table in an existing database, uploading files or images, and updating user profiles to
name a few. Normal datasets serve as referent or baseline datasets to evaluate the benchmark. Once
a benchmark is established based on normal traffic, the benchmark can then be applied to data in
a controlled environment with known attack inputs. This process allows individuals to determine
the number and types of attacks the benchmark can detect. The detection of data security breaches
in particular may rely on detecting certain types of application-layer attacks. For instance, the
emerging threats against web applications are generally methods used to exploit vulnerabilities
that attackers target in the datasets of web applications.

65

Chapter 8: Conclusions and Future Work
8.1 Conclusions
In this thesis, we proposed an IDS framework based on an information theory metric to detect web
application attacks. The focus was on detecting four types of web-based attacks SQLI, XSS, RFI,
and DT. We proposed three cross entropy measures on parameter, value, and data type. We
evaluated our approach with a generated dataset by deploying a large scale content management
web application. The evaluation suggests that the proposed measures can be applied to detect all
the introduced attacks with a 100% detection rate, while the lowest false positive rate is below 1%.
Further, all three measures can perform better than two related detection approaches we included:
length of value and Mahalanobis Distance.

Next, we contributed to the development of a GA-Based IDS where a set of web logs were
converted to chromosomes and new attack signatures were generated. The approach addresses the
current limitations of signature-based IDS. A limited number of known attack signatures poses a
problem, as does the lack of variation of attack signatures. This may cause a system to miss an
attack in the traffic log. We evaluated our approach with a generated attack dataset from a large
scale PHP application. The results find that the use of a GA is successful and can act as a
complement to other existing signature-based IDS approaches. The larger the population size of
chromosomes becomes (representing numerous rules), the better the GA achieves the capability to
detect new attacks. Further, by increasing the selection rate and mutation rate, we can generate
new attack detection rules that can address the limitation of traditional signature-based IDS such
as the referenced PHPIDS.

Finally, we discussed how a benchmark is defined, the advantages and disadvantages of the
existing benchmarks and the data attributes that previous authors have analyzed within Chapter 5.
The metrics and characteristics previously applied to other datasets for application-layer attack
detection were explained. Additionally, an in-depth description of the host environment was
provided and samples of log files that would be used to evaluate the benchmark were included.
We explained entropy and cross entropy measures taken from information theory concepts and
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how those metrics were applied to the present dataset with a case study. The methodology of the
case study was compared to other existing application-layer attack detection approaches to
demonstrate its performance. We intend to deploy even more web applications to validate this
benchmark approach while also continuing to compare the approach against others in the literature.

Analysis of logs is a common source of detailed information about what occurs on a network or
host system. Logs with differing content can cause conflicts when trying to present specific
findings. By developing a framework for a hybrid intrusion detection system, the log data can be
used to identify attacks and increase detection rates. A hybrid model can be implemented by the
combination of an anomaly detector that is based on cross entropy measures and a signature
detection method that incorporates the proposed genetic algorithm. Due to the results we obtained
in our two case studies, it can be concluded that our approaches are valid and may be useful for
others to reference.

8.2 Future Work
The results of our work have shown that improving attack detection rates was a feasible goal.
However, obstacles were also introduced into the work. This happened with the web applications
we intended to use for the studies. We plan to deploy more open source web applications to
evaluate the IDS approach. We will expand our work to include those four web applications and
repeat the studies as one large study that implements each approach into the finalized hybrid model.
In our future work, we will compare our proposed techniques based on any additional methods
seen in the literature. For instance, we can compare our genetic algorithm approach to other
algorithms seen in related works. We also plan to implement our combined approaches is through
the use of a rule-based technique that combines the cross entropy measures used earlier into one
metric. Developing a hybrid intrusion detection system derived from our methods thus far seems
to be the beginning of the ever-changing attacks that hackers continuously execute.
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